Introduction
When faced with uncertainty over the state of the world, players will gather information in two ways: by experimentation and by observing other players' actions. While experimentation is a direct way to learn, observing other players' actions is an indirect, but important way to gather information as those actions by others may re ect their private information. This paper studies a multi-person two-armed bandit model where both experimentation and the observation of other players' actions provide useful information for players. In this model, the two arms represent the experiments players choose between in each period. Each arm, if experimented, yields the payo of either 1 (a success) or 0 (a failure) with constant but unknown probabilities. Two or more players play this same bandit (or equivalent bandits) in parallel each attempting to maximize the discounted intertemporal payo over in nitely many periods. While the choice of an arm in the past by every player is publicly observable, the outcome of each experiment is privately observed by each player. It follows that players' actions convey information about the outcome of their experiments, as well as information about how they have interpreted other players' actions given their own private information. We are interested in answering the following question in this framework: \Will all players eventually settle on the same arm with probability one?"
The literature on experimentation, common knowledge or learning does not provide a de nitive answer to the above question.
In his pioneering work on experimentation, Rothschild 21 ] studies a single-person twoarmed bandit, and shows that the player ends up with the wrong arm with positive probability. Rothschild 21] conjectures from this fact that the two players observing each other's actions may as well settle on di erent arms. The reasoning is as follows: When a single player plays a two-armed bandit, he settles on the wrong arm with positive probability because he will give up the right arm if he happens to have bad draws on that arm. Even if there are two players, therefore, they may settle on di erent arms both thinking that it is the other player who is playing the wrong arm after having had bad draws on the right arm. In the context where players are store owners and the arms are the prices that they can choose between, Rothschild 21] writes: \... One could well ask whether they (stores) would be content charging the prices 3 that they think are best while observing that other stores -presumably rationalare charging di erent prices. I do not think this is a particularly compelling point. Unless store A has access to store B's books, the mere fact that store B is charging a price di erent from A's and not going bankrupt is not conclusive evidence that A is doing the wrong thing. Who is to say A's experience is not a better guide to the true state of a airs than B's? ..."
The more recent literature on common knowledge, on the other hand, suggests that it is impossible for the players to agree to disagree as to which arm is better. Bacharach 2] constructs a model of common knowledge that is most closely related to the current framework. In his model, players with private information adjust their actions observing the move of others in the previous round. Bacharach 2] nds that the players will settle on the same action if private information is represented by a nite partition, and if the players do not act strategically and play only pure actions. His theorem does not apply to the present model since uncertainty here arises not only before the game but also during the course of play through experiments, and more important, players may act strategically as they are not myopic. 1 Theorems in the learning literature often describe asymptotic behavior of dynamics arising from repeated interaction. In that literature, however, it is typically assumed that every player knows the exact relationship between the actions of all players and his own payo . 2 In the two-armed bandit problem, however, players do not have such knowledge simply because the parameters of the arms are random variables.
The objective of this paper is to give a partial answer to the above question by showing that under a certain restriction on the probability distribution of the parameters of the arms, players will indeed settle on the same arm with probability one in any Nash equilibrium of the game. To be more speci c, let x and y denote the parameters (probabilities of success 1 Although a player's payo does not directly depend on other players' actions, he may act strategically to collect information more e ciently. For example, player 1 may experiment on one arm in order to induce player 2 to experiment on the same arm and extract information from 2's subsequent moves. For this reason, it is not clear if direct communication among players leads to honest information sharing. 2 See, for example, Jordan 14, 15] and Nyarko 20] . See also Kalai and Lehrer 16] for a discussion on Rothschild's 21] conclusion on a single-person two-armed bandit model. 4
in each trial) of arms X and Y , respectively. The requirement is that x and y be di erent by a xed margin with probability one. The conclusion is valid even if players begin with some private information so that some of them originally believe that x > y is likely while others believe the opposite. It should be noted that in the single-person model of Rothschild 21] , the probability distribution of (x;y) has full support and hence does not satisfy our condition. His conclusion that the rational player ends up with the wrong arm with positive probability in the single-person model, however, is true even with the class of probability distributions discussed in this paper. Little is known, however, about dynamics where rational players repeatedly revise decisions over time based on experimentation and the observation of others. 3 The conclusion of the present paper sheds some light on such dynamics. For example, it provides one explanation for the \herd behavior," a phenomenon where people's choice tends to exhibit conformity rather than diversity. 4 The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section formulates a model when the parameters of the arms may take only nitely many values. The convergence result is established in Section 3. An extension of the result to the case of a continuous distribution of parameters is discussed at the end of Section 3. Section 4 discusses related issues. It is also shown in Section 4 that when mutual observability is violated, players may settle on di erent arms with positive probability.
Model
A two-armed bandit is played in nitely many times by the nite set I of players (jIj 2). Call the two arms X and Y , respectively. An experiment on each arm results in either a success (q = 1) or a failure (q = 0). The outcomes of experiments on arm X (resp. Y ) form a Bernoulli distribution with success probability x (resp. y). Random variables x and y take values in a nite set R = fr 1 ;:::;r n g, where 0 r 1 < < r n 1. Let W R 2 be the support of the joint distribution of x and y. We make the following assumption on the support W. strategy speci es which arm to play given any pair of public and own private histories. Player i's mixed strategy is a probability distribution on the set of pure strategies. 5 Let i be the set of i's mixed strategies and ?i = Q j6 =i j and = Q i2I i be the sets of mixed strategy pro les. Since the signal pro le s 2 S may be interpreted as a correlation device, strategies can be correlated conditional on the signals s. 6 Let be the set of probability distributions of (x;y;s) on W S, and take an arbitrary distribution 2 . The distribution will be xed in what follows. Let = W H 1 Z 1
(with the product -algebra) be the set of stochastic elements in the model on which the evolution of play is de ned. 7 Any mixed strategy pro le 2 (together with the distribution 5 Consideration of mixed strategies is necessary since the interaction among players may be strategic. 6 Similarly, strategies and (x;y) can be correlated conditional on s. 7 For simplicity, abbreviated notation will be used for subsets of . For example, fx = r k g 6 ) induces a probability distribution on . Player i's stage payo in any period is 1 if his experiment is successful and 0 otherwise.
Let i 2 0;1) be player i's discount factor. We assume that i is common knowledge. 8 When the expectation operator corresponding to the probability distribution is denoted E , player i's payo given = ( i ; eventually settle on the same arm with -probability one.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is as follows: It is seen below (Lemma 3) that each player must settle on either arm with probability one. Given this, we rst argue that if one of the arms has the lowest parameter, then the players cannot settle on di erent arms. Suppose to the contrary that they did settle on di erent arms when, say, x takes the lowest possible value r 1 . Since each player eventually learns the parameter of the arm they play in nitely often by the law of large numbers (Lemma 1), the players who have settled on arm X would learn that x has the lowest possible value. This would force them to switch to arm Y (Lemma 2), which they know to be better by assumption. This implies that the event where either arm has the lowest parameter is incompatible with the event where players settle on di erent arms. Once this possibility is eliminated, however, the same logic can be used to deduce that the event where either arm has the second lowest parameter is also denotes f = (x;y;h 1 ;z 1 ) 2 : x = r k g. incompatible with the event where players settle on di erent arms. Using induction, we conclude that it is only when both arms have the same highest parameter (i.e., x = y = r n ) that the players may settle on di erent arms. This, however, is a zero-probability event by assumption. Note that the theorem does not assert that the players eventually settle on the \right" arm, which yields the higher expected payo .
Formally, let F i (resp. G i ) be the event where player i plays arm X (resp. Y ) in nitely often. For any 2 , i 2 I, k = 1;:::;n, h t 2 H t , and z t i 2 Z t i (t 2 Z + ), let t (i;k) = (x = r k j h t ;z t i ) and t (i;k) = (y = r k j h t ;z t i ). Namely, t (i;k) (resp. t (i;k)) is the posterior probability that x = r k (resp. y = r k ) according to conditional on the information available to player i after period t. Clearly, t (i;k) and t (i;k) are random variables with respect to ( ; ).
The proof of the theorem involves three lemmas whose proofs are given in the appendix. Lemma 1 is about the consistency of players' beliefs. If a player only observes his own history, it can be shown that his Bayes updated posterior beliefs about x (resp. y) converge to the true value if he plays arm X (resp. Y ) in nitely often. This result can then be used to show that a player's estimates are consistent even when he observes other players' actions. Let B = Q i2I B i . Clearly, if is an equilibrium, then 2 B. Lemma 2 states that when player i plays a best response ( i 2 B i ), (i) he will play the arm with the higher expected value if he is almost certain about the parameters of both arms, and (ii) he will not keep playing one arm (with probability close to one) if he is almost certain about its value and strongly believes that the other arm has a higher (but uncertain) value. 11 11 As for (i), when the distributions of the parameters x and y have thick tails, the mere comparison of their expected values is not informative about which arm a player may play. ) (a t+1 i = a t+2 i = = X j h t ; z t i ) < 1 ? :
Lemma 3 asserts that under Assumption 1, a player will eventually settle on one arm with probability one since after playing both arms su ciently many times, he will be able to conclude which arm is better with high accuracy. 12 Let C i = n (F i \ G i ) be the event where player i settles on one arm, and C = T i2I C i be the event where every player settles on one (but not necessarily the same) arm. Namely, when players i and j keep playing di erent arms, they asymptotically believe that they will settle on di erent arms forever. Step Let and be as speci ed in Lemma 2(ii). In view of (1) Since fa t+1 i = a t+2 i = = Xg D s for t s, (a t+1 i = a t+2 i = = X j h t ; z t i ) > 1 ? . Combining (7)- (9), we conclude that for any = 1;:::;k, (5) then follows from (6) and (10).
Let and be as speci ed in Lemma 2(ii). In view of (1), (4) and (5) The extension to the three-armed bandit case, for example, is straightforward. When we denote by z the success probability of the third arm, the same conclusion is obtained if W f(x;y;z) 2 R 3 : x 6 = y 6 = z 6 = xg: Also, the result of the above analysis readily extends to the case of a continuous distribution of (x;y) satisfying the following condition: Assumption 2: There exists > 0 such that W f(x;y) 2 0;1] 2 : jx ? yj g. Assumption 2 guarantees that x and y are never too close to each other. Under this assumption, we can use the same type of logic as in the case of a nite distribution. Fix any 2 , where is the set of probability distributions on W S. The argument for the convergence result is essentially the same as before except that the induction is now with respect to \bands of width " in the parameter space rather than k's. 15 The following result is stated without a proof. Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. In any Nash equilibrium 2 , all players eventually settle on the same arm with -probability one.
Discussion
Much remains unknown about what happens when the support restriction (Assumption 1) does not hold. Since it is clear that players' actions need not converge if, for example, the two arms have the same value with probability one (i.e., (x = y) = 1), the relevant question is if the players settle on the same arm conditional on x 6 = y. 16 It turns out that this is a very di cult problem. In fact, we encounter di culty at the very beginning of the proof of Theorem 1: Although r 1 is still the worst possible value for any arm, it does not immediately lead to the conclusion that player i who currently plays arm X with x = r 1 will switch to arm Y . First, player i learns the parameter of the arm he plays in nitely often only asymptotically. In nite time, hence, he does not know for sure that x = r 1 even if that is indeed the case. Second, without the support restriction, we know of no argument that excludes the possibility that player i playing arm X when x = r 1 believes (asymptotically) that arm Y is equally poor even when other players keep playing Y . For these reasons, it is di cult to exclude the possibility that player i settles on arm X when x = r 1 . It should be noted, however, that the support restriction can be relaxed when more restrictions are imposed on players and their information. Speci cally, Aoyagi 1] formulates a model with two myopic players (i.e., 1 = 2 = 0) who each know the value of one arm which remains unknown to the other. It proves the convergence results for distributions with full support using an argument di erent from that in the present paper.
In the previous sections, it is assumed that every player observes the actions of all other players in the past. Alternatively, suppose that only some subset of players can observe other players' actions. In contrast to our previous conclusions, players may settle down on di erent arms with positive probability in this case. The following example illustrates this.
Suppose that I = f1;2g and that player 2 observes every action of player 1, while player 1 observes no action of player 2. Let = ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 be the strategy pro le and be the joint distribution of (x;y;s). For simplicity, assume n = 3, and (y = r 3 ) = (y = r 1 ) = 1=2, and (x = r 2 ) = 1. Namely, arm X is a \safe" arm that generates a success with a known probability r 2 while arm Y is a \risky" arm for which y takes one of two values with equal probabilities. Note that the support restriction (Assumption 1) in Section 2 is satis ed. Note also that when player 1 exclusively plays arm X, he receives no information about the performance of arm Y since he does not observe player 2's actions. Suppose that the two players have the same discount factor. The set of private signals is given by S 1 = S 2 = f 1 ; 2 g, and signals s 1 and s 2 are identically distributed and independent conditional on y. Let Thus, signal 1 indicates y = r 1 strongly and signal 2 indicates y = r 3 (even more) strongly.
Proposition 3. In any Nash equilibrium 2 , players 1 and 2 settle on di erent arms with positive -probability.
Proof: Suppose that y = r 3 , s 1 = 1 and s 2 = 2 . This occurs with positive probability.
It follows from Lemma 2(i) that player 1 never plays arm Y since his belief (y = r 1 j s 1 = 1 ) = does not change as long as he plays arm X. On the other hand, player 2'sinitial belief (after receiving the private signal) is given by (y = r 3 j s 2 = 2 ) = 1 ? . Conditional on s 2 = 2 , his posterior weight on fy = r 3 g, t (2;3) = (y = r 3 j h t ;z t 2 ), forms a martingale with respect to ( j s 2 = 2 ) with the initial term 0 (2;3) = 1 ? . Let M = f 2 : inf t2N t (2;3) > 1 ? g be the event where player 2's posterior weight on fy = r 3 g never falls below 1? . By Lemma 2(i), player 2 will keep playing arm Y throughout the game conditional on this event M. Therefore, the proposition is proved if it is shown that (11) (M j y = r 3 ;s 1 = 1 ;s 2 = 2 ) > 0:
The maximal inequality for positive martingales (e.g., Neveu 19 > ;
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that < =(2 2 + 1). It follows from (12) and (13) (a1) follows from (a2), (a3) and (a4).
We now turn to the proof of (lim t!1 t = 1 j x = r k ;F i ) = 1. Write 1 = (x = r k j We then have
where the rst equality follows from the de nition of G, the second from (a5), and the third from the fact that the set G is (z 1 ix )-measurable. Since 1 1, (a6) and (a7) show that ( 1 = 1 j G) = 1 must be true. This and (a1) imply the desired conclusion ( 1 = 1 j x = r k ;F i ) = T < 1 j (x;y) = (r k ;r`);F i \ G i = 1, and (ii) t (i;k) > 1 ? and t (i;`) > 1 ? for any t T . It follows from (ii) and Lemma 2(i) that (a t+1 i = a t+2 i = = Y j T = t) = 1 for any t 2 N such that (T = t) > 0. Since fa t+1 i = a t+2 i = = Y g G i n F i for any t 2 N, we have (G i n F i j T = t) = 1 for any t 2 N such that (T = t) > 0, or equivalently, (G i n F i j T < 1) = 1. This and (i) above yield a contradiction that ? G i n F i j (x;y) = (r k ;r`);F i \ G i = 1. //
